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**Article** *in* Middle Eastern Studies · July 2006

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*Middle Eastern Studies,*
*Vol. 42, No. 4, 587–602, July 2006*

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

# Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey

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Turkey's Ottoman heritage has been a critical issue of the country's culture and identity during the era of the Republic. In recent times a dramatic shift in the perception of the Ottoman past has emerged, even among Turkey's ruling cadre, a shift that demonstrates tolerant (rather than reactionary) and refined (rather than cruel) dimensions, and finds clear expression in popular culture, in fashion, architecture, the media and, perhaps most important, in political life. In the late 1980s, Turkish politics was subject to a war of cultures which was caused by the rise of the separatist Kurdish movement, which had rejected the homogenous Turkish identity and turned to violent action, the Islamist groups that included severe critics of the official policy of secularism, together with the Alevis, which condemned the state's propagation for Sunni-based Islam. This war of cultures resulted in questioning the official definition of Turkish culture and its implications for political membership. This was also coupled with the emergence of new states especially in the Balkans, entailing ethnic estrangement (and eventually assaults on Balkan Muslims, Ottoman 'souvenirs' for Turks remembering the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Balkans for centuries 'peacefully', by the imperial notion of pluralism). Some conservative and nationalist Turkish policymakers, especially Turgut Özal (prime minister between 1983 and 1989 and president between 1989 and 1993), began to use Turkey's Ottoman legacy to resolve internal sociocultural tensions that resulted from cultural diversity, and to determine Turkish foreign policies, especially toward the Balkans. The Ottoman legacy was used to invoke a collective cultural memory by constructing a nostalgic narrative of Turkey's shared past. Coupled with competing elite groups' struggle over the country's collective memory, this was a deliberate attempt to reconstruct the present; it was 'cultural memorization', which Bal defines as 'an activity occurring in the present, in which the past is continuously modified and redescribed even as it continues to shape the future'.[1]

This paper examines the political implications of the use of the Ottoman view of pluralism to curb the demands of various social identities in Turkey in the 1990s. I seek to show how the idea of *Ottoman pluralism*, which entails the peaceful coexistence of different ethno-religious and cultural groups under a political community, was constructed as part of *neo-Ottomanism* combining the traditional Ottoman form of pluralism with modern liberal multiculturalism and how this model was used to

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/06/040587-16 © 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00263200600642274

formulate a common, superior identity encompassing all Turkish citizens within a religio-ethnic affiliation. Through the mid-1990s, Turkey faced the rise of Islamism, which Islamized to some extent Ozalian neo-Ottomanism. In this study I also show that the Islamic form of neo-Ottomanism has the connotation of an 'exclusionary' legal pluralism inspired by the Islamic/Ottoman form of multi-legal entities (Ottoman version is the *millet* system) defined mainly in terms of religious differences.

The emergence and spread of counter-memories led to the regime's reaction of Kemalist hegemony, which came as the retrieval of the cultural memory of the 1930s, the golden age of Kemalism,[2] in which new 'civilized' manners were introduced to and imposed upon the masses.

In a rapidly globalizing world, the 'secure world' of the nation-state that monopolizes all cultural arrangements and activities within its borders has been challenged by two well-known parallel processes. These are universalization (e.g., the global spread of consumption and cultural patterns, and of such political values as human rights and democratic government), and localization (e.g., reconceptualizing local traditional forms as sources of identity).[3] The result is the rise of new identification processes and the emergence of new historiographies, which reject the universal account of 'Western history'. Furthermore, this trend, through the 1980s and the 1990s, was coupled with the critique of Western-oriented modernization. As a result, the search for identity at the local level acted against both the nation-state form and Western hegemonic narratives. In the process, the most contested issue has been a 'unified' history of nation-states. Mike Featherstone describes the 'discovery of the lesser traditions of history, the suppressed history of outsider groups such as women, slaves, ethnic minorities' that seek to 'assert themselves against a unified history within the nation-state', and this 'task of establishing history in the context of contested global histories' necessitates that 'postcolonial histories start to be written which effectively ''speak back to the West'''.[4]

In this sense the quest for neo-Ottomanism that signifies rewriting Turkish history on the basis of a shared Ottoman past in a globalizing context becomes more meaningful. Neo-Ottomanism as an act of constructing a new present has, as Yavuz notes, two main characteristics: (1) 'the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past'; (2) 'the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries', but respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the ex-Ottoman space.[5] Both these characteristics of neo-Ottomanism are clearly seen in the efforts of Özal, who emphasized the necessity of constructing a new common cultural identity binding groups with different particular affiliations in Turkey, and who attempted to unify the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, especially by pragmatic and cultural means. But neo-Ottomanism is not an anti-Western, counter-hegemonic movement that challenges the universal ideals of the West. It rejects naïve dichotomies between the West and the rest, between modernity and tradition, emphasizing political and economic globalization (the prevalence of liberal democracy and free market economy) together with a localized common identity.

However, appropriating secular West versus Islamic East dichotomy, the Islamic groups' Ottomanism came to be an anti-Western, as well as anti-secular

establishment, movement. The act of remembering the Ottoman heritage through a political formulation certainly does have political and cultural implications for Kemalism, which, in the construction of a new Turkish society and culture, deemed the Ottoman Empire as a significant Other. Such forms of negative implication of the return of Ottomanism are true also for the Balkan and Middle East states that constructed national identities on the basis of new histories that degraded Ottomanism as an alien system.

One might claim that the act of remembering that retrieved the Ottoman past as a collective memory for 1990s Turkey was indeed part of a general trend to question the present as shaped through struggles of various groups over common identity and moral values; an endeavour for origins to shed light on blurred personalities and places. 'Remembering', writes Sturken, 'becomes a process of achieving closer proximity to wholeness, of erasing forgetting... Thus, the positioning of memory as a process through which origins are retrieved means positing forgetting as an act of misrecognition.'[6] In terms of newly emergent searches for collectivities, that means the reconstruction of the past for the present, which increases its density by globalization processes all over the world. Late 1980s and 1990s Turkey witnessed the rediscovery of various pasts to construct new identities, or counter-memories, such as Kurdish, Islamic, Balkan; that in fact stemmed from the failure of Kemalist modernization projects to produce new strategies for inclusion.[7] These new modes of identification, or rising cultural pluralization, happened in parallel with a huge sociological transformation that was accelerated by the emergence of new social networks and connections, new patterns of association and social relationships. Within such a framework, and within the debates around Turkish identity and the multicultural nature of Turkey's population, some conservative and nationalist politicians and intellectuals reimagined the Ottoman past, and especially its cultural pluralism, as a model for the identity and political unity questions of the present.

The idea of Ottomanism as an ideology of modern political patriotism became the official line in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Ottoman reformers formulated it as the Ottoman Empire faced nationalist separatist movements, especially in the Balkans. Under the influence of Western legal and political system, *Tanzimat Fermanı* (1839, the reform edict) and *Kanun-i Esasi* (1876, the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire) provided legal and political bases for Ottomanism. The policy was in fact a rearticulation of the Empire's *millet* system that, as the most developed form of 'imperial pluralism', had established the autonomous religious communities, called *millet*s (including Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Jewish). Ottomanism, the idea of a common homeland and common traits based on modern patriotic citizenship and universal law, was developed to provide Ottoman unity in the context of each ethnic-religious group's efforts to develop its own nationalism. Karpat aptly defines Ottomanism as an 'attempt by the Ottoman government to use one single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and language'.[8] It was from everything else a political identification with the territorial fatherland.

Although the Ottoman *millet* system had provided mainly for religious pluralism,[9] its new articulation under the modern ideology granted new political and civil rights

to its citizens regardless of their religious differences. That political membership to the state reflected the 'imagined' Ottoman nation, making all Ottoman subjects think of themselves as Ottoman (*Osmanli*). By using the secular term *Ottoman* as the name of a collective identity transcending all community-based identities grounded in religion, the reformers hoped to demonstrate that ethnic and religious affiliations were of secondary importance.[10] The expectation was that collective identity would inspire the loyalty of Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian separatists, and later Armenian and Albanian nationalists. It is because Ottomanism functioned as the rhetoric of the modern public sphere that the age-old Muslim/non-Muslim category was reformulated in terms of a majority/minority logic that is the end product of the modern public sphere. The nature of the *millet*s began to be redefined in a secular and egalitarian way and transformed into minorities and majorities.[11] In short, as a new technique to govern various religio-ethnic groups, or as a modern version of cultural pluralism, Ottomanism served to create a consciousness of being Ottoman through melting various groups into one pot, establishing a modern citizenship. Just only in the last decades of the Empire (1910s) it lost its significance as the Turkish nationalists gradually came to dominate Ottoman politics.

The Ottoman imperial structure became a modern state with a nationalist ideology through the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Kemalist rulers worked to destroy all that was Ottoman, using exclusivist logic of modernity versus tradition – erasing Ottomanism was deemed necessary to adopt Western political forms. During the first two decades of the Republic, especially in the 1930s under the guidance of the Turkish History Society (founded in 1931), a group of politician-historians determined a Kemalist historiography as the national mythology: Ottoman history, culture and literature were rejected and replaced with a new myth of Central Asia and Anatolia to form a 'civilized' Turkish culture and identity. History was highly politicized; the aim was to rediscover the civilized and cultured essence, the talent of the Turks, to tie the new culture to their prehistoric past by following the traces of Western civilization.[12]

The new nation's politician-historians (in what seems to have been an attempt to rewrite Ottoman historiography), described the Ottomans' view of history as closely tied to divine authority and following the genealogy of the Sultanate. 'Ottoman history', writes Yusuf Akçura (one of the leading politician-historians of the 1930s), 'did not pay enough attention to the Turkish language and history, and also did radically separate itself from Turkish history. The great victories and achievements of the Turkish nation to which the Ottomans belonged were not taken into account when writing history.'[13] That is, according to the new Kemalist Ottoman historiography, there had been not a Turkish nation, but a Muslim community whose members had to be unconditionally faithful to the Sultanate, and the non-Turkish character of the Ottoman Empire brought about the failure of the Turks in their leadership of civilization. In the Kemalist historiography the reason the Turks became decadent and corrupt was the rule of the Sultanate, and the subjugation of the Turkish nation. Thus, the rulers of the new regime deemed Ottoman rule 'the dark age' of the Turks; and, in writing a new and glorious history for the Turks, should be ignored.

The Turkish Revolution demanded a complete rupture with the Ottoman order, seen to be antithetical to the new Turkish order with its entire worldview and institutions. Thus the legitimate history of Republican Turkey began with the War of Independence on 19 May 1919; time was restarted with that date. Implicit in this rearrangement of time was the significant Other that was the Ottoman-Islamic past. In the Kemalist discourse, the Ottoman-Islamic past belonged to another time that determines its status as provisional and illegitimate, and disappeared in the face of the continuing march of progress. None of the attitudes, cadres, or programmes existing before 19 May 1919 belonged to legitimate Turkish history but rather to a different historical realm.[14] The founders of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s reconstructed the Ottoman past as the archaic other of the new, modern regime.

The Turkish reformers' main intention was to end the Ottoman multicultural and multinational legacy by melding all differences under the name of Turk. The Ottoman Muslim population (including Turks, Kurds, Caucasians, Bosnians, Albanians, Lazs) became the dominant group in Anatolia, especially after the population exchange with Greece in the early 1920s. The reformist rulers strove to transmute the Ottoman Muslims into a 'civilized', homogenous Turkish nation. Non-Muslims (Greeks, Armenians, Jews) living in Turkey were Turks in citizenship only, but Muslim migrants from the Balkans (Bosnians, Albanians) and the Caucasus were easily naturalized and accepted as part of the Turkish nation. For the rulers, the transformation of the people from a religious identity to a modern and national identity was possible only by means of a secular state and society.

Despite Kemalist policy, Ottomanism survived in the Turkish popular culture, in popular stories and entertainment, and in intellectual, especially literary, works. Within the multiparty system, these notions found place in some political parties' manifestos, particularly in the Democrat Party of the 1950s, which carried the official definition of history as a chief objective of political debate, stressing the significance of local Islamic traditions and continuity with the near past – i.e. the Ottomans. A larger place was reserved for the Ottoman Empire and its political and social system in history textbooks. Ottoman artistic figures and portraits of the Ottoman sultan began to appear in *La Turquie Kémaliste*, the official and prestigious magazine that from the early 1930s was published to show Western countries how civilized the Turks were.[15] The centre-right parties, including the Democrat Party (DP) (1950–60) to Justice Party (1960–80) line, saw the Ottoman era as part of Turkish collective memory; the nationalist rightist politicians, represented by the National Action Party, used the idea of the Ottoman Empire to portray the Turks' glorious past; and religious rightists, represented by the pro-Islamist National Salvation Party (1971–80) to Welfare Party (1983–98) line, strove to Islamize it in accordance with its general tendency of Islamizing Turkish historiography. Ottoman imagination and images continued to exist and even increased in Turkish popular social and political life until the late 1980s, but that imagination had not yet turned into a political vision combining the Ottoman system with modern political principles to produce policy.

Turgut Özal became a leading figure in perpetuating Ottomanism as the core of a political vision based on a new collective memory, for a new form of foreign policy

and social contract. As a conservative and nationalist politician, he had had from the beginning a strong interest in the Ottoman past as a state of belonging and a source of collective memory. Parallel to a cultural policy of the 1980 coup, based in a large measure on 'Turkish–Islamic synthesis',[16] the government under his rule (as Premier, 1983–89) effectively popularized such Ottoman cultural traits as classical Turkish music and some linguistic forms, using state-controlled television and radio broadcasting. The education system was also an important vehicle: history textbooks preached the goodness of the Turks' Ottoman past, making all Ottoman history part of Turkish collective memory, but on the basis of Kemalist legitimacy.[17] Rising official concern was evident in the commemoration of the 700th anniversary of the Ottoman state, when the ministry of culture, under a pro-Kemalist left-wing party, emphasized the Republic as 'the historical heir of the Ottomans'.

Özal's time was one of collective memory wars of the Republican regime, which occurred concurrently with global crises of modernity, the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia. In that context Özal found himself in a debate on Ottomanism – especially during his presidency.[18] When new states in previous Ottoman hinterlands, and concurrently new national strategies at the international level, emerged, and when ethnic separatism and religious extremism gained momentum at the national level, Özal began to be more interested in the Ottoman heritage politically. Defining the Republic of Turkey as the heir to the Ottoman Empire, he attempted to make Ottomanism part of the Turkish identity. On some occasions he used it as a historical reference to legitimize the official sense of belonging and memory, and on others to form alternative social projects.[19] Equating American and Ottoman multiculturalism as forms of 'melting pots', he proposed a new model of cultural pluralism based on the Ottoman legacy. This was articulated for the first time in the late 1980s, in the context of the emerging crises of the failure of Turkey's official cultural identity to meet rising ethnic and religious claims, of the Bulgarian government's Turkish and Muslim minority assimilation policies, of the emergence of new Turkic states in Central Asia and of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This was the call of an anti-establishment effort to form a democratic system in which every kind of difference can express itself without any state intervention.

Regarding the developments in the post-Cold War era, Özal claimed that there 'opened new horizons for Turkey'; here ex-Ottoman lands and people (especially Muslims) achieved much more importance to provide a new multicultural synthesis for Turkey and the Balkans.[20] For Özal, the Ottoman perspective with its multicultural, multireligious and multinational structure provides a suitable model for the Balkans, where ethnic conflict was continuing to overwhelm daily life, and for Turkey facing ethnic (Kurdish) separatism.[21] Thus, during the early 1990s, some leading Turkish liberal and conservative intellectuals, led by Özal, began to make references to the multireligious and multicultural nature of the Ottoman Empire.[22] In developing neo-Ottomanist ideas he formed an effective cooperation with *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Ankara-based, right-wing monthly journal) circle. *Türkiye Günlüğü* became the voice of neo-Ottomanist views and sought to publicize the new synthesis constructed on the basis of 'imperial vision' and Ottoman pluralist system.[23] Cengiz Çandar, one of the main leading figures in the formulation of neo-Ottomanism,

mentioned 'imperial vision' in order to express the new direction of the Republic of Turkey, moving from 'monocultural and closed' nation-state form to multicultural and multiethnic structure.[24] Neo-Ottomanists rejected the ethnic version of Turkish nationalism and reinterpreted Turkish identity on the basis of regional and religious grounds (multiethnic and multireligious bases) and cosmopolitan liberal values. Thus, for Çandar, the premises of neo-Ottomanism are free enterprise, human rights and cultural and ethnic pluralism.[25] So in place of ethnic identity, the common religious one (Muslim identity) had to be more and more emphasized.

This is very obvious in the views of Özal. In re-imagining Ottoman pluralism that set the model for a new Turkey, Özal placed emphasis on the Ottoman vision of Islam that is more flexible and tolerant, and, for him, 'this has given Turkish society a different outlook from that of other Islamic societies. As a result of its cosmopolitan foundations, moreover, the Ottoman State was open to other cultural influences'.[26] In his view, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, migration from the ex-Ottoman lands turned Anatolia into a cultural and ethnic mosaic, where Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Caucasians and Alevis began to live side by side and a solution for Turkey's identity crisis seemed possible from the Ottoman vision of cultural pluralism nurtured by Islam.[27] Here it is clear that Ottoman identity was reconstructed as a form of national-religious identity comprising several sub-cultural, ethnic and regional identities. This formulation was seen as necessary because in a new global world difference and diversity in every sense were becoming dominant in every sphere of life. For Özal and other neo-Ottomanists only such a vision had the power to make Turkey a regional super-power once again. As mentioned in the second section, the neo-Ottomanist imperial formulation used the new Ottoman cultural identity not as counter-hegemonic, but as being part of a globalizing Western world.

But Özal had selectively reconstructed Ottomanism as an identity in religio-ethnic (Muslim-Turkish) terms seemingly contrary to the nineteenth century's Ottomanism that, as mentioned above, entailed the coexistence of non-Muslims and Muslims under a modern state system. We can grasp Özal's scope and aims in developing Ottomanism as a technique of cultural pluralism by comparing the two forms of Ottomanism. Although the targeted groups in Özal's neo-Ottomanism were different from nineteenth-century Ottomanism, there are some basic similarities. These are: (1) the reorganization of the state in accord with a changing international context, forming a new political identity and culture to prevent the rise of nationalist movements, and, in the search for such culture, seeking an eclectic synthesis between traditional forms and Western values; and (2) although Özalian neo-Ottomanism defined citizenship differently from nineteenth-century Ottomanism by placing more emphasis on a common Ottoman-Islamic identity, in the construction of neo-Ottomanism as a myth of the melting pot, those considered Ottoman but with different ethnic and cultural affiliations were the spiritual grandchildren of the Muslim populations of the Empire, the ruling millet (*millet-i hakime*).[28] However it seems clear that this vision was more exclusionary than nineteenth-century Ottomanism, which signified a political membership, and so is inadequate in providing a more inclusive multicultural context.

As mentioned above, the emergence of new states in the ex-Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans, triggered a debate in Turkey on the official policy of

*forgetting* the Ottoman legacy – particularly forgetting Turkey's Balkan past, although there have been many Turkish citizens with Balkan-Muslim origins. The Serbian nationalists' attempt at ethnic cleansing of the Bosnians and later the Albanian minority in Kosovo (by equating the terms Muslim/Turk/Ottoman), attacks on Ottoman monuments, and rising ethnic conflict in Macedonia were tragic events that reminded both the Balkan Muslim population and Turkish citizens of their common Ottoman ancestors, of their knowledge of a common Ottoman culture. (Those incidents seemed to show us clearly that the Ottoman vision, with its multicultural characteristics, looks better than nationalist ideologies that appear more modern.) This 'rediscovery of the country's heritage', its 'historical responsibility' engendered in the Turks' wider public support for Bosnian Muslims, as attacks on the Bosnians made the past a part of daily life. One might equate the Bosnian war and the rise of Ottoman consciousness among Bosnian Muslims and Turkish citizens; in fact, largely because of the Ottoman past and a common heritage, Bosnian leaders looked to Turkey and tried to enlist its support in their resistance. In that public support for the issue of Bosnia, both historical (Ottoman) and religious (Islamic) motives played a significant role.[29] It was the common belief among the Turkish people that Western powers' indifference to the attacks on Muslim populations of the Balkans was due largely to religious differences. Developments in the Balkans therefore led most Turks to identify themselves with the Muslim populations of the ex-Ottoman lands, and neo-Ottomanist intellectuals effectively used the developments in the Balkans and the consequent position of Ottoman Muslims of the region to form their own ideological perspective. As Yavuz writes:

> The fact that Serbian nationalist ideology identifies all Muslims, whether they are Albanians, Bosnian, Pomak, or Gypsies as 'Turks' made the Turkish public more sensitive to the premeditated destruction of the Bosnian Muslims. Neo-Ottomanists, such Cengiz Çandar and Nur Vergin who had very close relations to Özal, used this as a way of arguing that 'Turkishness' is not an ethnic category but rather a construct for and by Anatolian, Balkan, and Caucasian Muslim populations on the basis of their common Ottoman experience. Thus, as a result of internal and international pressure, Turkey is pushed to ally itself with the Ottoman Muslims of the Balkans.[30]

That construction brought about not only the discovery of Ottoman Muslim populations of the Balkans as part of Turkey's identity, but also the discovery of the multicultural nature of the country's own population, which included Bosnians, Albanians and Pomaks as well as Turks, Kurds, Caucasians and Arabs. The official inclination to protect Balkan Muslims also coincided with Bosnian, Albanian and other Balkan-origin citizens' celebrations of their differences publicly (but not as counter-hegemonic movements rejecting the unity of Turkey).[31] Turkey's Kemalist establishment emphasized homogeneity in terms of a common Turkish identity, having had from the beginning an uneasy relation with the imperial pluralism of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to Kemalism, the goal of neo-Ottomanists was to create 'a new Turkey . . . determined not by any exclusivist form of racial and linguistic characteristics but rather by a shared Ottoman historical experience and a broad and

diffuse attachment to Islam'.[32] So the Kemalist officials generally conceived neo-Ottomanist searches to legitimize the politico-cultural claims of various ethnic and religious groups as a challenge to the basic principles of the Republic. Contrary to Özal's perspective, civil and military bureaucrats commonly evaluated the developments in the Balkans by negating their historical and cultural aspects,[33] for those developments were making the people of Bosnian, Albanian and Pomak origin conscious of their ethnic identities.

From the early years of the Republic official policy had attempted to Turkify Balkan migrants by the process of *forgetting*. The Law of Settlement that was issued in 1934 established policy to regulate the migration and settlement of Balkan Muslims in Turkey.[34] It stipulated that membership in Turkish culture was available to any Muslim living in the Balkans, with or without Turkish ethnic origin[35] – because of their Ottoman heritage they were officially viewed as Turks who had simply forgotten their language. In the official discourse those immigrants could not be called 'Bosnian', 'Albanian' or 'Pomak', which were allowed as different languages in the Ottoman 'cosmopolitan structure'. Differences were not ethnic, just linguistic – a difference that would be overcome through Turkification policies bringing about linguistic and cultural integration. Though this policy had moderated to some extent by the early 1990s, the Kemalist establishment resisted all neo-Ottomanist attempts that sought to institutionalize ethnic and religious differences, and after the death of Özal in 1993, public interest in neo-Ottomanism as a political formulation of cultural pluralism gradually lost its momentum. Nevertheless, neo-Ottomanism survived in the views and programmes of the political right, especially the religious right party, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (WP, *Refah Partisi*, the heir of the 1970s National Salvation Party, NSP), which became Turkey's biggest political party in the 1995 elections.

The Welfare Party's re-traditionalization included the redefinition of the people's identity through Islamic principles and the memories of the near, Ottoman past. On the basis of some aspects of the Islamic movement that had already described Ottoman history as part of Islamic history and the Ottoman state as an Islamic state since the 1970s, the new moral base was constructed. It was regarded as necessary to project a holistic vision of community, a secure shelter for all, as an antidote to the evils of modern individualism and alienation. In the 1995 election campaigns, the discourse of the WP had a populist tone, embracing all segments and ethnic and religious differences of the country. The WP's programme, which included Islamist, nationalist, Ottomanist and modernist elements, was aimed at determining the boundaries of a new community by offering a prescription to define the symbols of sociopolitical and socioeconomic life.[36] Among WP leaders and intellectuals, use of the Ottoman imagination depended upon a successful combination of Turkishness and Islamic belief.[37] In strengthening and disseminating their own anti-Western positions, they also effectively used such external developments as the failure, in their view, of the Western powers to prevent Serbian nationalists' genocide attempts in Bosnia to mobilize and even Islamicize the masses.

WP municipal leaders and the WP-led coalition government, in adopting the politics of symbols, attempted to acculturate – in truth, to Islamicize – Turkish

society, and the Ottoman way of life and politics had an important place in that process.[38] The WP mayors, especially in the big cities, throughout the second half of the 1990s, revived Ottoman arts, calligraphy, foods and architectural forms, integrating them into Turkish life. Alternative commemorations, countering official ones, were launched to reformulate the past to 'construct an alternative national identity, evoked as an Ottoman-Islamic civilization as opposed to the secular, modern Turkish Republic'.[39] By 1994 the WP mayor of Istanbul began effectively to launch a set of activities commemorating the Istanbul of Ottoman times.[40] Among them was the commemoration of the myth of the Conqueror (Sultan Mehmed II), whose Istanbul was a place of Islam. Its rejuvenation was commemorated on the alternative national day of the Conquest of Istanbul. The myth of the Istanbul of the Conqueror has, as Bora argues, two symbolic aspects: 'First, it is the symbol of Ottoman (that is Islamic) hegemony. Secondly, it is the symbol of the justice and the multiplicity of Islam. ... Within this discourse, Istanbul is the proud example of Muslim-Turkish justice which offers protection to foreigner-non-Muslim members.'[41] According to the pro-Islamists' idea of pluralism, such a just system would be possible only under Islamic rule.

The WP ruling cadre and intellectuals' nostalgia for the Ottomans included a kind of nationalist-imperialist imagination anticipating creating once again the Greater Turkey as in Ottoman times. They seemed to appropriate 'Özalian neo-Ottomanism with more Islamic tones'.[42] They became passionate champions of reinstituting and regenerating the spirit of *pax Ottomania*, especially in the ex-Ottoman provinces. While the WP was in power (1996–97), in accordance with such neo-Ottomanist pursuits, Islam and Ottomanism were used in foreign policy to make Turkey a dominant regional power, and both constituted the foundation of the WP's search for solutions to Turkey's internal political crises. Especially in dealing with cultural diversity, WP leaders seemed to adopt an Islamic intellectuals' formulation of multiculturalism that was based on the classical Islamic mechanism of legal pluralities, according to which each group is treated according to its own legal system (read as 'religion') – Islamic, Christian, Jewish, atheist.

In the early 1990s, an Islamic model of pluralism called 'multi-judiciary order' was first developed and proposed on the basis of the Prophet Mohammad's 'Medina Document' and Ottoman *millet* system by a group of Islamic intellectuals including Ali Bulaç, Abdurrahman Dilipak and İsmet Özel.[43] Later in 1993 the WP adopted it as one of the premises of its programme.[44] These Islamist intellectuals criticized the Kemalist view of monoculturalism rejecting the representation of different cultural groups at the public sphere and promoted the Islamic view of pluralism that anticipates the emergence of a form of legal pluralism relying on the idea of the self-rule of each legal community and rejecting the rule of the majority.[45] Difference is here defined in terms of religions and different groups within same religion. Islam as a religion provides a legal framework for the functioning of multiculturalism on the basis of multi-legalism. Such 'multi-judiciarism' was proposed as an alternative to 'democracy', particularly 'liberal democratic pluralism'.

The model of multi-judiciary society was based on the idea that multireligious and multicultural society is normally multi-judiciary, for laws and rules are not independent from religions and cultures. This multi-judiciary state model is formulated as a kind of 'confederation of beliefs' and promoted as an alternative

to democracy.[46] Here society and its values were seen as politically more important than the hegemonic modern state. This can also be observed in the WP's view of society.[47] Thus, that legal pluralism in which religious groups have legal and cultural autonomy seeks to realize the survival of civil societal elements against the hegemonic state. For Bulaç, because emerging and prevalent differences in society means the dissolution of the homogenizing and totalizing account of the modern nation-state, what is needed is a strong public sphere organized around communities, in which religion plays a determining role, but not individuals. Put another way, legal pluralism stresses the survival and dominance of homogenous communities where, if necessary, individual liberties and rights might be ignored for the sake of the whole. In this view of multiculturalism based on homogenous communities, individuals are seen as parts of an organic religious community, which stems from seeing human rights as a group right, but not as individual rights. That is to say, community comes before the individual. Here there was a strong emphasis on the religious communities of the Ottoman *millet* system: Ali Bulaç writes, 'When we compare the Ottoman system with the modern state, it was no doubt more civil and legally pluralistic'.[48] Another Islamist writer proposed the Ottoman *millet* system as a panacea to resolve Turkey's ethnic problem.[49]

The WP adopted the above-mentioned Islamic communitarian view of multiculturalism in an age of identity politics, and the emergence and survival of autonomous legal communities (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, atheist, etc.), each with its own parochial law. On that base the WP model was designed as a model of citizenship alternative to both Kemalist monism and liberal democracy. As I mentioned above, this view of pluralism, which recalls the Ottoman practice of Islamic pluralism called the Ottoman *millet* system, found wide support in WP circles. As Navaro-Yashin aptly notes:

> Islamists have revived the Ottoman *millet* system as an example of government they argue to be more just, humane, and superior to the monism of the secular nation-state. *Millet* was the name for religious communities in the Ottoman Empire, communities which had their autonomous legal systems. Welfare Party activists share in this revivalist vision of Islamist intellectual. They believe that the pluralist example from the past can serve as an alternative model of citizenship to the faulty modern one.[50]

In fact, a hierarchical ordering among different communal bodies constitutes the basis of the 'Islamic formula' – some communities are credited as being more virtuous, more faithful than other secular or non-Muslim ones.

WP pluralism based on the re-articulation of the Ottoman *millet* system was not welcomed by Turkey's official ideology, Kemalism, which addresses national unity on the basis of monoculturalism. Kemalist officials removed the WP from power in 1997 by an intervention into politics called the February 28 process, and the legal case filed against the party cited the its view of religious pluralism as one of the reasons. Turkey's Supreme Court, as it closed the WP in 1998, also pointed to Ottoman pluralism as one of the reasons for their action. On this issue, to justify its judgment, as Aslan writes, 'it (the Court) cited public statements by Erbakan such as . . . ''you shall have the right to opt for whatever law you want'' (legal pluralism)'.[51]

This struggle between Kemalist secularist uniformity and the Islamic quest for 'multiculturalism', both based on the rediscovery of historical memory, affected Turkish social and political life.

The endeavours to construct a new past for the nation and an alternative collective cultural memory, especially among Islamists in the second half of the 1990s, inspired Kemalist groups to launch a new programme to transmute Kemalism into a social identity by remembering the Republican past. Debates on the past between the Kemalist secularist groups and the conservative and pro-Islamic groups turned on competing politico-moral standards and different lifestyles. One Kemalist claimed that the Ottoman Empire and its pluralism do not have any relevance for today's Turkish politics and society, being an 'alien' and 'pre-historical' structure; that the Ottoman model that failed to adopt modern developments cannot set an archetype for a modern nation.[52]

The Kemalist establishment initiated commemorative activities to celebrate Atatürk's time, the formative years of the Republican regime and to retrieve the spirit of Kemalism. The ceremonies of Republic Day on 29 October gained particular importance for Kemalist and secularist officials and groups after the rise of the Welfare Party (the 'Islamic threat'), with its emphasis on the Ottoman past and celebration of the 'Conquest of Istanbul'. Republic Day has been celebrated since the 1930s as a 'holiday of reforms' or a 'holiday whereby people came to appreciate their own achievements'.[53] The rising tide of such commemorations in the 1990s seemed to be central to mobilizing social awareness of the achievements and civilized qualities of the Republic. Remembrance of the Kemalist past was directly related to the process of reconstructing Kemalism in the 1990s for the sake of the hegemony of the secularist establishment.[54] The effort to transmute Kemalism into a social identity was effected through organizing such social activities as rallies, conferences, concerts and balls; and establishing a network of Atatürkist/Kemalist civil societal elements, such as the Society for Atatürkist Thought and the Society to Support Contemporary Life.

In 1990s Turkey, the Ottoman past was re-imagined to formulate a political model of cultural pluralism in accordance with modern multicultural ideas. A group of rulers and intellectuals proposed a mythologized Ottoman cultural pluralism to co-opt Turkey's cultural pluralization, a movement fuelled by the demands of ethnic groups and religious communities that resulted from the globalization process and the crisis of Kemalist modernization. The failure of both the liberal-conservative (Özal) and the Islamic (Welfare) imaginations to find wide support within Turkey's ruling cadre and intellectuals is due to theoretical poverty, to a pragmatic outlook and to challenging Kemalist secularist national uniformity by stressing Islam as the core of Turkish identity. Özal attempted to combine modern liberal pluralism with Ottoman imperial pluralism in the absence of a consolidated democracy, and, as Walzer argues, the 'peaceful coexistence of groups of people with different histories, cultures and identities' seems to be possible only in the context of political stability and a widespread democratic practice.[55] During the 1990s Turkey did not see the emergence of such a political structure, and neo-Ottomanists failed to form a common identity due to their strong emphasis on culturalism. On the other hand, the

Islamic formula of pluralism, which was highly exclusionary in terms of relying on the idea of strict separation of religious groups/communities and being in the name of forming alternative collective memory, broke down after the decline of Islamic politics toward the end of the 1990s. The heirs of the WP and Islamic intellectuals who previously stressed the multi-judiciary order and Ottoman pluralism have begun to highlight a new synthesis of liberal democratic pluralism and Islamic values.

The neo-Ottomanist perspective posed two main challenges to the Turkish secular nation-state. First, its imperial vision disturbed the state's premises related to both national homogeneity and foreign policy. Second, it recalled the existence of cultural diversity and cultural pluralism in Turkish society. These challenges revealed the fact that the old and ongoing problem of Turkey's official ideology, Kemalism, is to integrate cultural, ethnic and religious differences into national politics. It is these differences which exist in general as centres of symbolic and local authority that perform various social and political functions in the country.

**Acknowledgements**

An earlier version of this article was presented at 'Balkan Societies in Change: The Use of Historical Myths' (November 2002, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina). I would like to thank the participants for their comments. I am grateful to the Eastern Mediterranean University (Gazimagusa, TRNC, Mersin-10, Turkey) Research Fund which made this study possible.

## Notes

1. M. Bal, 'Introduction', in M. Bal *et al.* (eds.), *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1999), p.vii.
2. Kemalism was formulated as a state ideology in the 1930s and was founded on a very selective *forgetting* of the 'shameful' Ottoman/Islamic past. It has remained a hegemonic cultural memory to the present, although there have been some structural changes. From the beginning, although it does not reflect a coherent structure or has been redefined according to changing contexts, it has come to the fore as a 'political discourse' used both for describing the boundaries of politics and also as the standard of judging attitudes in the public realm. For Kemalism and its different versions see E. Aydın, 'The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The *Ülkü* Version of Kemalism, 1933–1936', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.40, No.5 (2004), pp.55–82.
3. For both processes, see R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).
4. M. Featherstone, 'Postnational Flows, Identity Formation and Cultural Space', in E. Ben-Rafael and Y. Sternberg (eds.), *Identity, Culture and Globalization* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p.485.
5. See M.H. Yavuz, 'Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism', *Critique* (Spring 1998), p.40.
6. M. Sturken, 'Narratives of Recovery: Repressed Memory as Cultural Memory', in Bal *et al.* (eds.), *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present*, p.243.
7. See S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1997) for a detailed analysis of the official modernity project and its failure in different realms to realize its basic premises.
8. K.H. Karpat, 'Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk', in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2000), p.6. In terms of the issue of citizenship, Karpat, in one of his previous studies, writes: 'Thus, by 1850 the millet members began to be treated already as Ottoman "citizens", although the formal

nationality law was not passed until 1869. This law, which is often cited as having created a new and modern legal status for Ottoman subjects, was a mere technicality that legalized and clarified further an already established concept'. K.H. Karpat, '*Millet*s and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol.I (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), p.162.

9. In the pre-modern era, the Ottoman *millet* system reflected a ruling mechanism in which various (religious) communities were incorporated into the Ottoman system as autonomous bodies. That incorporation occurred through being 'hierarchically' ordered under a system of legal pluralism. In this system religious differences were conceived of as 'given' and entitled to a legal status. For the Ottoman *millet* system see N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p.10. For an analysis of relations between the *millet* system and religious pluralism see W. Kymlicka, 'Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance', in D. Held (ed.), *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.81–105.
10. Ş. Hanioğlu, 'Osmanlıcılık' (Ottomanism), in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1983), p.1390.
11. This led to the loss of the classical structure of non-Muslim groups as autonomous religious communities and they became 'minority groups'. K.H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East', in M.J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (eds.), *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
12. For the state's formulation of history for the early Republican Turkey, see Y. Çolak, 'History-Writing, State and Culture Production in Turkey in the 1930s', in L. Pinnell (ed.), *Interruptions: Essays in the Poetics/Politics of Space* (Gazimagusa, North Cyprus: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, 2003), pp.117–45.
13. Y. Akçura, 'Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi' (First Turkish History Congress), *Ülkü*, No.1 (Feb. 1933), p.26.
14. Mesut Yeğen argues that from then on, in the Kemalist historiography, 'the palace, Sultans and Istanbul; the caliphate, Islam, tradition; Circassians, Laz, Kurd; the CUP, Freedom and Entente and Vahdettin; Cemal, Talat and Enver, all belonged to some other historical realm, not to the past'. M. Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (Kurdish Question in the State Discourse) (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999), p.193.
15. On the front page of the first issue of the magazine after the DP came to power in 1950 there was a portrait of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror's entrance into Istanbul after capturing the city.
16. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was first formulated in the 1970s by a group of right-wing intellectuals called *Aydınlar Ocağı* (The Hearth of the Enlightened) which, in the 1980s under the guidance of the generals of the 1980 coup, achieved a semi-official status. It was an attempt to combine Turkish ethno-national identity with Turkey's Ottoman and Islamic past. Indeed, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis found clear expression in the 1982 constitution with reference to the significance of Turkish historical and moral values reflected most truly in the Ottoman-Turkish culture. The state elite hoped such reference would make it possible to avoid a 'moral and historical void' that might be filled by Marxist and Islamic fanaticism. For an extensive analysis of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, see B. Güvenc *et al*., *Türk-İslam Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) (Istanbul: Sarmal Yay, 1991).
17. There is a lot of 'Kemalist input' in describing the Ottoman age, which is a sign of the end of the Kemalist taboo about the Ottomans, or about the continuity between the Ottomans and Kemalism. See E. Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine* (From Turkish History Thesis to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay, 1998), p.194.
18. Ş.H. Çalış, *Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-Osmanlılık, Özal ve Balkanlar* (Imaginary Science and Imagined Identity: Neo-Ottomanism, Özal and the Balkans) (Konya: Çizgi, 2001), p.102.
19. Ibid., p.111.
20. See *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No.19 (1992), pp.10–15.
21. Ibid., pp.16 and 20; for this perspective, also see C. Çandar, '21. Yüzyıla Doğru Türkiye: Tarih ve Jeopolitiğin İntikamı' (Turkey towards the 21st Century: Revenge of History and Geopolitics), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No.19 (1992), p.33.
22. For this move, see G. Çetinsaya, 'Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde "Osmanlıcılık"' ('Ottomanism' in Republican Turkey), in A. Çiğdem (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt. 4: Muhafazakarlık* (Political Thought in Modern Turkey, Vol.5: Conservatism) (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), pp.378–80.

23. Mustafa Çalık, Cengiz Çandar, Ahmet Turan Alkan, Nur Vergin and Deniz Gürsel were the main intellectuals voicing neo-Ottomanist views in *Türkiye Günlüğü* during the early 1990s. For a concise, editorial description of the discussion maintained in the journal, see M. Çalık, 'Neo-Osmanlı Tartışmalarına Sade Bir Derkenar' (A Marginal Note on Neo-Ottomanism Discussions), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No.19 (1992), p.1.
24. Çandar, '21. Yüzyıla Doğru Türkiye'. Also for the emphasis on imperial vision see M. Çalık, 'Miras Davasında Yol Ayrımı: Hangi Türkiye?' (Forking in the Inheritance Case: Which Turkey?), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No.19 (1993), pp.1–5.
25. Çandar, '21. Yüzyıla Doğru Türkiye', p.33.
26. T. Özal, *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey* (Northern Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brothers, 1991), p.290.
27. For Özal, Islam is the basic binding mechanism transcending ethnic and regional differences: 'It is religion that blends Muslims of Anatolia and the Balkans. Therefore, Islam is a powerful cement of co-existence and cooperation among diverse Muslim groups... Being a Turk in the ex-Ottoman space means being a Muslim or vice versa'. Quoted in Yavuz, 'Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux', p.24.
28. For these similarities, see A. Davudoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position) (Istanbul: Küre Yay, 2001), p.85.
29. See Çalış, *Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler*, pp.136–7. This can be also observed in Turkey's new foreign policy based on 'the Imperial Ottoman tradition' as 'neo-Ottoman model'. See S. Constantinides, 'Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy: The Neo-Ottoman Model', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol.24, No.2 (1996), pp.323–4.
30. Yavuz, 'Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux', p.37.
31. Turkish citizens with Balkan, Crimean and Caucasus origins established their own associations that do not depend on 'any conflict between their current Turkish identity and their ancestral and regional identities shaped during Ottoman rule'. Karpat, 'Introduction', in Karpat (ed.) *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, p.xvi.
32. Yavuz, 'Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux', p.24.
33. Çalış, *Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler*, p.146.
34. For the Law and its analysis on the basis of formation of Turkish identity, see Y. Çolak, 'Nationalism and State in Turkey: Drawing the Boundaries of ''Turkish Culture'' in the 1930s', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol.3, No.1 (2003), pp.2–20.
35. Although the migration of Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted, the migrations of the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with Christian origins, were rejected. S.A. Somel, 'Osmanlı' dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği' (Turkish Identity from the Ottoman to the Republic), in N. Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* (Republic, Democracy and Identity) (Istanbul: Bağlam Yay, 1997), p.81.
36. Like the Kemalists, its leaders conceived the democratic mechanism to establish their 'alternative' symbolic universe, setting some prescriptions for a new public identity. For the WP's view of democracy and society see E. Aydın and Y. Çolak, 'Dilemmas of Turkish Democracy: The Encounter Between Kemalist Secularism and Political Islamism in the 1990s', in D.W. Odell-Scott (ed.), *Democracy and Religion: Free Exercise and Diverse Visions* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2004), pp.349–80.
37. T. Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, Islamcılık* (Three Dimensions of Turkish Right: Nationalism, Conservatism, Islamism) (Istanbul: Birikim, 1999), p.133.
38. See M. H. Yavoz, 'Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1 (2000), pp.21–42.
39. A. Çınar, 'National History as a Contested Site: The Conquest of Istanbul and Islamist Negotiations of the Nation', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.43, No.2 (2001), pp.364–91.
40. These activities for 1994 and later years are documented in detail in *İstanbul Bülteni* (Istanbul Bulletin), monthly official journal of Istanbul Municipality. Istanbul Municipality gave special importance to the 700th anniversary of the Ottoman Empire, as mentioned above, celebrated in 1999 throughout the country. Among the activities there was a series of scientific conferences called 'Ottoman Conferences', exhibitions showing 'Ottoman Arts', 'Ottoman Istanbul', 'Portraits of Sultans', 'Ottoman Cloths', 'Ottoman Tradesmen', 'Ottoman Calligraphy', and so on, concerts of Ottoman-Turkish music, and movies about the Ottomans. *İstanbul Bülteni*, No.120 (1999), pp.20–21.

41. T. Bora, 'Dreams of the Turkish Right', *Mediterranean 10* (Winter 1997–98), pp.296–7.
42. Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, p.137.
43. For the discussions on the Medina Document and its view of pluralism see A. Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası Hakkında Genel Bilgiler' (General Information on Medina Document), *Birikim*, No.38–39 (1992), pp.102–11; 'Medine Vesikası Üzerine Tartışmalar I' (Discussions on Medina Document), *Birikim*, No.47 (1993), pp.40–46; and Ali Bulaç, 'Medine Vesikası Üzerine Tartışmalar II' (Discussions on Medina Document II), *Birikim*, Vol.48 (1993), pp.48–58.
44. H. Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri* (Politics of Identites: Roots of Political Islam in Turkey) (Istanbul: Metis, 2002), p.96.
45. For the relationship between Islamic view of pluralism and rule of the people, see A. Bulaç, *İslam ve Demokrasi* (Islam and Democracy) (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1993).
46. See Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, pp.159, 160.
47. WP's leaders claimed that 'they are the true representatives of ''society'', and so when they came to power especially in influential municipalities, they began to revive the ''symbols'' and ''values'' of the society'. Aydın and Çolak, 'Dilemmas of Turkish Democracy', p.366.
48. Quoted in Gülalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*, p.97.
49. Ibid., p.168.
50. Y. Navaro-Yashin, 'Uses and Abuses of ''State and Civil Society'' in Contemporary Turkey', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.18 (Spring 1998), p.12.
51. Z. Aslan, 'Conflicting Paradigms: Political Rights in the Turkish Constitutional Court', *Critique*, Vol.11, No.1 (2002), p.17.
52. Ö. İnce, 'Osmanlı Modeli' (Ottoman Model), *Hürriyet Pazar*, 25 Aug. 2002.
53. A. Öztürkmen, 'Celebrating National Holidays in Turkey: History and Memory', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.25 (2001), p.71.
54. See B. Yazıcı, '''Discovering Our Past'': Are ''We'' Breaking Taboos? Reconstructing Ataturkism and the Past in Contemporary Turkey', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.25 (2001), pp.1–30.
55. M. Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p.25.

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