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Nationalism and the State in Turkey: Drawing the Boundaries of 'Turkish Culture' in the 1930s

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This study seeks to explore the process surrounding the discursive formation of culture in 1930s Turkey, which constituted the core of the Kemalist modernization project. It is based on the selective analysis of statements by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), founder of modern Turkey, the Programmes and Law of Settlement of the Republican People's Party (the RPP, Turkey's only party from 1923 to 1945), which set a discursive framework for the process of drawing the boundaries of Turkish culture. It seems obvious that, during the formative years of the Republic, the Turkish state promoted a state-led nationalism that signified the will to modernize and civilize society. On this basis, the state effectively produced, re-produced and disseminated a form of culture, which became the vehicle for projecting a vision of 'the modern way of life'. In this study I demonstrate that the new Turkish culture was inclusionary and at the same time exclusionary in terms of determining the boundaries of political and cultural membership.

Forms of Nationalism and State

In recent times nationalism, nation-building, national identity and ethnicity in Turkey have become the subject of several studies. All these studies, tackling the formative years of the Republic and later developments from various angles of nation-building, base their arguments on a model evolved around ethnic versus civic nationalism (Behar 1996; Kadíoglu 1996; Íçduygu 1996; Poulton 1997; Yíldíz 2001a). Working through dual categories of civic / western / liberal / individualistic versus ethnic / eastern / cultural / collectivistic, in which the former are deemed good, and the latter bad (see Brown 1999: 284-286), this dichotomous model has recently attracted many criticisms that reject the idealization of the civic model as a simple political entity free from any cultural bias. In this distinction, culture has a peculiar position generally tied with the ethnic / Eastern type of

nationalism. Nevertheless, all aspects conceptualized within the framework of culture are in fact deep-seated in both conceptions, which means that everything collected under the name of 'civic' is also bound up with a specific conception of culture (see Kymlicka 1997; Yack 1996; Nieguth 1999). Beyond this dichotomy, as Nieguth argues that new 'organizing principles' such as 'ancestry', 'race', 'culture' and 'territory' may be employed to define the boundaries of nation (Nieguth 1999: 155-56). In this sense, this study employs the concept of culture as a main explanatory category in examining state-nationalism relations in Turkey. Here, culture is not used simply as an entity that expresses 'given' and 'distinctive' sets of values but as 'constructed' and 'contingent' regarding its relation to the nation-state and nationalism (Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994: 3). Being integral to power relations within the confinement of the modern nation-state, culture plays a decisive role in the construction of nations and national identities. The basic goal of the architects of national cultures is to provide a link between membership to the political community (state) and belonging to the cultural community (nation), which both confer the status of citizenship. Relying on a modernist programme of culture, states in the West and the rest of the world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have maintained active policies to shape their own citizens (Bennett 1998: 104). It is in this respect that culture as a constitutive part of the nation comes to the fore as a product of the political discourse of nationalism. The role of the state in shaping culture becomes much more apparent in terms of Tilly's elaboration of nationalism as 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' (Tilly 1996).

According to 'top-down' or 'state-led' nationalism, the sovereign state seeks to create a nation by describing and determining its nature and boundaries. Its pioneers have two functions: a) to reform the existing state and b) to modernize people believed to be 'backward'; reforming the state and modernizing the people are closely connected to the formation of the nation including 'standardized national languages, national histories, pageants, ceremonies, songs, banners, museums, schools, and much more' (Tilly 1996: 304). This stand makes the pioneers think of themselves as the only group involved in interpreting the collective interest of the nation. Thus, it is 'subject to the logic of nation-building and needs to explore ways of turning its more or less heterogeneous people into a nation' (Parekh 1995: 36). According to that logic, membership of a political and cultural community is defined in more or less political terms rather than in racial and ethnic terms. It is therefore not exclusive of accepting outsiders as members but they must give up their old ways of life and become culturally integrated into the imagined cultural community. That community signifies a way of life surrounded with cultural memories, myths and symbols.

Contrary to the state-generated one, 'bottom-up' nationalism is about a movement to form a state. By struggling and organizing on the basis of nationalism, the leaders of national or ethnic groups strive to form their own independent political entity. They claim a separate state on the basis of the emergence of a unique national community (Tilly 1994: 133). It is the quest for turning the existing people into fellow citizens. So, it appeared to be a unifying force by collecting separate power centers under the canopy of a unified, centralized state, as was the case in Germany, and self-conscious nationalist groups setting up the state, as in the case of Israel. In this nationalist understanding, ethnic and cultural features are taken for granted as the identity of people is regarded as the identifying aspects of membership of both the nation and the state; in other words, it is exclusive in defining the criteria of citizenship.

Both types manifest two different ways of establishing unity between the state and culture (Nieguth 1999: 157). In fact, the 'direction' of this process has a central place in the production of culture that is determinedly realized through memories, myths, rituals and common ancestry. In this sense, the role of nationalism in cultural production becomes much clearer by situating it in the two types of processes establishing ties between the state and citizens.

Turkish Official Nationalism and a New Phase in State-led Modernization in the 1930s

The nationalism of the Turkish Republic (founded in 1923), also called 'Kemalist nationalism' (Yíldíz 2001b), was totally different from the Turkist/ Turanist nationalism of the last two decades of the Ottoman Empire, in the sense that it was based on the principle of territoriality, pragmatically conditioned within the confines of Anatolia, but not on the basis of ethnicity (on its territorial characteristics see Poulton (1997: 93-94)). Also, because of its rejection of a living, authentic value system, it was automatically distinguished from the views of Ziya Gökalp, who as the main theoretician of Turkism in the 1910s and early 1920s placed a significant emphasis on 'authentic' and 'religious' values. Thus, Kemalist nationalism came to be a reaction to 'backwardness' (regarded as resulting from the philosophy and system of the ancien régime, or the Ottoman/Islamic Empire), rather than 'foreignness' (Kandiyoti 1993). That is why, unlike the attempts of other non-Western and anti-colonial nationalists, who placed strong emphasis on traditional and local values in determining their very identity, Kemalists did not wish to make a synthesis of the material civilization of the West and indigenous cultural traits.[1] In doing so, they refused the idea of culture as a protest against Modernity to preserve its own particular way, which meant a rejection of being the oriental and the antagonistic other of the West.

By its very nature, 'Kemalist nationalism' was top-down, or state-led, nationalism. Its first goal was to modernize the state and social structures via a project of social engineering. It was a vigorous search from above for the creation of a new nation and the invention of a new Turk by eliminating the popular notions of Islam and Ottoman heritage. Its project of turning existing more or less ethnically and culturally heterogeneous people into a nation depended on the binary logic of 'old' and 'new' (Bozkurt 1995 (original publication 1940): 72-73). The main intention of the civilizing rulers was to end the Ottoman legacy by seeking to overcome the multinational character and maintain a political unity by eradicating the duality of high or elite culture versus mass culture. This discourse led to a strong orientation towards exploring ways of preserving the cohesion between the state and nation in the face of ethnic separatist and particularistic demands.

Although the Ottoman reform movement and ideological formations during the last century of the Empire provided a solid background to the Kemalist sweeping reforms, in the years after 1923, the nationalist movement evolved into a movement of making a modern nation state with the far-reaching goal of radically transforming the society and culture. Turkey was proclaimed a republic and turned into a nation-state. In accordance with the Kemalist idea of modernization/westernization that became the name of the creation of a new society, a set of radical westernizing reforms were put into practice throughout the 1920s. On the basis of that project, the Kemalist rulers promoted a secular state in place of Ottoman-Islamic one by making a strong-minded effort to westernize the country. In the process Western secular law, the idea of the nation, Latin alphabet, Western social intercourse and Western clothing replaced Ottoman traditions and cultural norms. Until the early 1930s, the reform movement found its justification to a greater extent in the concept of civilization in terms of adopting all aspects, values and codes of Western civilization. Here it seemed to be satisfactory on the part of the ruling elite to create a new moral and social structure to which all Turks would adhere. Changes in the socio-economic conditions and the growing need for a new ideological outlook to diffuse the Republican ideals more widely brought about a form of ideological reorientation in 1930. After the civilizing elite realized that the emphasis only on civilization was regarded as insufficient to meet the people's spiritual needs, which were as necessary as political ones for a modern society, the role was now given greatly to culture. The concept of culture became the motto of a new ideological orientation. The context in which the official notion of culture was shaped was the social milieu of the 1930s, as the state and its 'knowing' rulers began re-defining their conceptual framework in terms of culture and its relation to civilization.

By 1929 the radical westernizing reforms of the 1920s, bad economic conditions substantially caused by the 1929 Great Depression, and continuing rebellions in eastern Anatolia, produced a rising tide of social discontent. This began to significantly threaten the Republic and its reforms. To provide an outlet for the social opposition and to cover up the mortal threat of stagnation and opposition, a political party, the Free Party (the FP), was founded in August 1930 as a loyal opposition party (Weiker 1973). The FP's criticism of the RPP's economic policies and its promise for more liberal political conditions immediately attracted a large group of enthusiastic followers. Coupled with demands for the re-institution of some previous symbols such as a return of the fez, the Arabic script and so on, its growing popularity began to turn immediately into a rising opposition to the westernizing reforms. The Republicans regarded its growing popularity as a threat to their own rule and the regime. Meanwhile, it ended with the dissolution of the FP by its leaders in November 1930, who alleged that it had become the instrument of counter-revolutionaries. This was followed by the Menemen incident, in which a group of 'religious fanatics' revolted to re-order the 'old' system in a town close to Ízmir. The reformist rulers saw it as one of the most dangerous reactions to the regime's principles. For the modernizing elite, this incident was alarming because it happened in one of the most developed provinces of Anatolia, not in a backward one. In the words of Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoglu), one of the leading Kemalists, the resentment and anxiety of the state elite found its clear expression: 'it is as though nothing has happened all these years, as though … the idea of any of our radical reforms has not altered anything in this country' (Quoted in Ahmad 1993: 60).

The social discontent and the experience of the FP gave the ruling elite a signal that the first phase of the civilizing project from above had failed. Although the modernizing reforms had become strong in the center (constituted by a close circle of members of the elite), they failed to create a sense of belonging and collectivity among the masses. That is to say, as Ahmad (1993: 61) argues, 'the mass of the people, even in the more advanced parts of the country, did not identify with the new state'. This meant that a cultural duality between the ruling cadre and the masses seen as the main enemy of the Republic continued to exist, and even widened through forging new life forms that were of the rulers and intellectuals in big cities.

This was the starting point for another phase of the making of Turkish culture. Thus, to refresh the revolutionary spirit of the Republic, a new ideological orientation was put to use. The name of the ideology was Kemalism, which

came into existence firstly at the Third Republican People's Party (RPP) Congress in 1931.[2] Accordingly, the measures taken at the Congress brought about the merging of the State and the Party; the result was a one party-dominated polity. All autonomous organizations outside State-Party control were banned. For Mustafa Kemal, it was necessary to unite 'all nationalist and republican forces' under the RPP to reach revolutionary goals (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements), vol. III: 130). Among them there were the Masonic lodges, the Women's Association, and most importantly the Turkish Hearths. Instead, new state-controlled institutions, 'cultural institutions of the Revolution', such as the Turkish History Society (THS, which worked to write a new history based on a secular past), the Turkish Language Society (TLS, which tried to create a value-free Turkish language), and the People's Houses (the centers of adult education) were established in 1931. Through the activities of the THS and the TLS the two theses, the Turkish history and language theses, were sustained. Both theses were used to prove that all civilizations were of Turkish origin; that is, Turkish history and language was the mother of world culture. Nevertheless, the People's Houses were founded to carry out the people's education and training (halk terbiyesi) through a nation-wide network of practicing new modes of behaviour beside the regular school education. The expectation from this sort of education was to make the nation a collective whole sharing a similar ideal (Peker 1933: 6). The Houses worked as a cultural branch of the ruling RPP to serve as a social and cultural milieu where modes of behaving, dressing, speaking, attending a public meeting or concert, and modes of eating were shown in explicit or implicit ways to the masses. The above-three institutions were regarded as the agents of educating and training new generations to be 'civilized' citizens within the revolutionary culture of the Republic (Necip Ali 1933: 245).

Here, as the General Secretary of the ruling Republican People's Party put it, the aim of the new measures resulting in a reorganization in the sphere of culture was to gain complete cultural control (Peker 1933). In fact, this reflected an ideological turn in the process of the making of national culture. Now, the greater emphasis in the Republican civilizing process was placed on the concept of culture that was deemed essential for the self-identification of the people. It is in this respect that, after 1930, culture appeared as the name of the search to promote collective identity to provide a sense of belonging necessary for social and cultural affinity. So, the rising interest of Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues throughout the 1930s in history and language was regarded necessary for the construction of an identity on the basis of modern ideals. This was a cultural crusade, led and maintained by Mustafa Kemal himself. All efforts throughout the 1930s seemed to be the

most significant steps in the attainment of monopolizing the legitimate use of culture, that is, establishing full cultural control over society, which had not been fully realized during the first decade of the Republic.

Mustafa Kemal and Culture

At this juncture, there existed the need to re-conceptualize culture that until that time, as a discourse, remained in large measure under the influence of Gökalp's notion of 'authentic', 'distinctive' culture. The seeds of the new official attitude to culture with the above-mentioned ideological turn may best be found at first in the thoughts and expressions of Mustafa Kemal.[3] In 1930, in the early days of the FP, Mustafa Kemal for the first time expressed his assertion on culture as being part of his thesis of civilization.[4] On the issue, he said:

> 'There are some people who define civilization in different ways. In my opinion it is hard and unnecessary to separate civilization from culture. In order to clarify my point of view, let me explain what culture is: it is the product of all achievements of a human society in the domains of (a) state, (b) thought, that is to say, science, social science, and fine arts, and (c) economy, that is to say, agriculture, crafts, trade, transportation and communication. When one talks about a nation's civilization, I think it may not be other than a product of all these three kind of domains. Of course, the degree of culture, or civilization, could not be the same. The difference may be seen in each sphere of life, as well as the agglomeration of three spheres. A high culture does not only belong to its owner nation, and, at the same time, has strong effects on other nations. Maybe, it is in this respect that a high and extensive culture is called civilization, such as European civilization, asr-i hazír (modern) civilization' (Afetinan 1969: 48).

What is significant here is the equation of the concept of culture with that of civilization and the setting of a hierarchy between a high and cultivated culture and primitive and savage one.

This conceptualization excludes the idea that culture is a solid structure of living values and customs. At that point, in the words Mustafa Kemal uttered in 1930, we find his implicit criticism of Gökalp's claims on the pre-eminence of spiritual peculiarities over civilization by equating the concept of culture with that of civilization (Afetinan 1969: 48-49). In his discourse, culture

could not be something challenging or in contrast to civilization but rather inherent to civilization. Thus, on the basis of this definition, he went on to say, 'all children of the Republic are cultural men; that is, they should internalize culture and, at the same time, be convinced of spreading this peculiarity to the whole Turkish nation' (Afetinan 1969: 50). It was the mentality that every 'civilized' Turkish citizen should have when picturing and determining his own way. For him, the only way to achieve that end is by taking advantage of the culture and methods of Europe, with which the elite has to be in constant cultural contact.

Thus, for Mustafa Kemal, science and scientific thinking as a basic principle and world-view seemed to be a determinant in shaping new life forms as a whole, which would result in the progress of culture. In order to work on and crystallize national culture in a scientific way, new institutions of culture were charged with a mission to work towards inventing new myths to bring the new Turks much closer to modern civilized nations, and, in this way, to create a sense of community around these myths. In such a way they became the instruments of cultural control over the people. By means of state agents new cultural codes were being spread and diffused widely. This was attempted through instituting new conventions and gatherings. Balls were one of them. As Wortham (1930: 177) reports, 'as the result of the impetus by the President, whose (official) balls at Angora became a regular feature of social life, the inhibitions of the professional and official classes were overcome, and 'dancing'… enjoyed such a vogue that young men with social talents found lucrative openings as dancing-masters'. The quest to institute Western forms of music might be given as another example; in the first half of the 1930s the broadcasting of Turkish music in radios was banned in favour of spreading Western music among the masses. To put it more simply, culture in Mustafa Kemal's usage includes all practices, habits and customs conceptualized within the framework of civilization; they came to be modes of 'softened' behavior, 'high level' of tastes, a way of thinking, scientific knowledge, and so on.

The Ideological Base of the Official Concept of Culture

The nature of new Turkish culture was clearly seen in the official legal and popular texts, such as the RPP's programmes and the Law of Settlement. Firstly the political roots of the Kemalist view of culture of the 1930s may be found in the 1923 program of the RPP. In that, there was a more or less clear definition of common culture based on the idea of assimilation that set in motion membership to the political community, namely the state. It was also based on the notion of a community of equals, made up of the people who were fused without any privilege and class. This orientation also took place

as a general rule in the 1927 programme of the RPP. Similarly, the programme attributed a key role to the acceptance and internalization of Turkish culture as a basic criterion for admission to the party. Culture here revolved more around nationalist and populist inclinations. (For the full text of the 1927 programme see Tunçay 1992: 382-394.)

The distinguishing peculiarity of the RPP's 1931[5] and 1935 programmes (Programme of the People's Party of the Republic 1935), which were written with an almost similar insight, was the existence of a clear definition of the nation; as it was mentioned in 1935 Programme, 'the nation is the political and social unit composed of citizens tied together by the bonds of language, culture and ideal'. In other words, culture together with language and the ideal were the constitutive parts of the nation in that they were fundamental in providing a sense of belonging to the citizens. Culture was something achieved with the constant education and training of children through schooling and of adults especially through the People's Houses. In this sense, as openly expressed in Part 4 on National Education and Instruction, the goal of cultural policy was expressed as the 'suppression of ignorance' by the process of education through which every citizen would be patriotic, civilized and nationalistic. At the heart of the policy was their intellectual and physical development necessary to enhance 'the character to the high level inspired by our great national history'. Key to this process was the teaching of the Turkish language and of Turkish history, in which the Turks' civilized ancestors had shown the true way to all civilizations. Also the fine arts and especially western-style music, as determined in Article 44, gained the utmost importance for the Party to instill 'the revolutionary culture' in the people. Parallel to that, Article 52 set 'the national opera and the national theatre' as one of main tasks of the Party. In sum, what was found in the programmes was the notion of culture which was something achieved, including aspects ranging from sharing a common language to attaining physical strength. In this sense, as cement to bind individuals together, it came to be the name of the modern way of life, woven around the civilizing ideals of the Revolution, which every Turkish citizen had to adopt through appropriation.

The other text, elaborated here, is the 10th Anniversary brochure prepared by Vedat Nedim (Tör) and Burhan Asaf (Belge) for the Ministry of Education, entitled '10' (10 1933). It was the standard and most circulated brochure in 1933 and later years, setting the model of all other publications on the Anniversary.[6] Thousands of copies of '10' as a main propaganda text were published and circulated in all parts of the country. Its slogans and illustrations were wallpapered on the walls of almost all school classrooms, the People's

Houses, the Party's local organizations, the official bureaus, and even the coffee houses (Webster 1939: 48-49).

This propaganda brochure was based on the comparison between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, focusing on 'how it was' and 'how it is', and full of condemnations of the past by revealing its 'backwardness', 'ignorance' and 'reactionism' and the 'historic' achievements of the new regime. The contents of '10' contained almost all the modifications, novelties, and the concepts the new regime dwelt on. It is worth mentioning here the pages on the appearances and styles of the new generation of the Republic. On the page 'how it was' the princes of the Empire were portrayed as unhappy and sulky in 'oriental' dress, but in the page 'how it is' children and youths dressed modernly were healthy, joyful, happy and certain (10: 8-9).[7] The children and youths pictured in 'what it is' seemed to be from a country of Europe, nearly all with blond hair and blue/green eyes. Other images and writings, ranging from women in schools and working places side by side with men to the well-covered volumes on modern Turkish history, were embedded in a dichotomy, the traditional/modern.

The Law of Settlement and the Boundaries of Turkish Culture

The Kemalist task of turning the existing human dust into a 'cultivated', 'cultured' whole finds its clear expression in the Law of Settlement (Ískan Kanunu), issued on June 14, 1934, which has been one of the most contested laws of the republican regime.[8] For the purpose of this study it is chosen to bind the factual events to the main arguments of the article. It was the significant document that determined the official policy of the population initiated to re-populate Anatolia and re-organize its population structure.[9] The Law, as defined in Article 1, was on 'the settlement and distribution of the population with respect to Turkish culture' (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi (TGNA Minutes Journal), IV/23, 7-6-1934: 73). Here the basic impulse of the Law was 'to provide cultural unity'. It was for this reason that it was part of the creation of the citizens faithful to Turkish culture.

In terms of settlement, Article 2 of the Law sought to re-map Turkey by dividing it into three main regions according to whether or not Turkish culture prevailed: the first one included the places where those who belonged to the Turkish race and culture were the majority. The second comprised the places reserved for those who would be transferred and settled to provide for their adoption of Turkish culture. And the third, the places which would be emptied and prohibited for settling and dwelling due to reasons of location, health, economy, culture, politics, military and security.[10] Even if they were old dwellers, anybody who did not belong to the Turkish culture would not be

permitted to re-settle in the first region. In this region the people of villages and ashirets (name of tribal structure in the Eastern region of Turkey) who had forgotten their language, but were of Turkish origin, were to be settled around villages, towns and cities, where Turkish culture prevailed.[11] What was clear from these regulations was that Turkish culture came to be a main criterion in determining the policy of settlement. This was accomplished on the basis of external (migration and refugees) and internal (position of nomads and different ethnic and religious groups) factors.

In the Law, the term *muhacir*, as established in Article 3, was used to refer to all settled and nomadic groups from Türk írkí (Turkish race), and to all settled peoples belonging to the Turkish culture who lived in foreign countries, especially in the Balkans, and wanted to migrate to Turkey as permanent settlers. Indeed, in practice as well as its official account, the Turkish race was not depicted merely in racial and ethnic terms, but as a sign of affiliation, and so the wish to be part of Turkish culture came as a basic principle in the definition.[12] It was clear in the Law that anyone who was accepted as a muhacir was easily and immediately naturalized, but, as made clear in Article 4, 'those who did not belong to the Turkish culture', 'anarchists', 'spies', 'nomadic gypsies' and 'exiles' were excluded. Paragraphs A and B of Article 7 determined the muhacirs' freedom of choosing where they settled; 'the migrants of Turkish origin' would be free to choose the suitable places to dwell, but 'those of non-Turkish origin' would have to settle where the government would approve for them; otherwise, their Turkish citizenship would be withdrawn. Although the former groups would settle in the first and second regions, the latter would only settle in the second. This means that membership to the Turkish culture was accessible to those who were Muslims living in the Balkans and Caucasus with or without Turkish ethnic origin.[13] Because of their Ottoman background they were considered Turks who had forgotten their language. Therefore, in the official discourse, those immigrants could not be called 'Bosnian', 'Albanian', 'Circassian', 'Georgian', or 'Laz', which had all been allowed as separate languages in the Ottoman 'cosmopolitan structure'. The basic difference was linguistic, which would be overcome through Turkification policies bringing about linguistic integration (See TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 69-79).

With regard to some of the people in the boundaries of Turkey, the Law brought forth the rearrangement of the status of nomadic tribes and nomadic gypsies, and the abolishment of the asirets. By the former regulation (Article 9 of the Law) the Revolutionary elite strove to settle, educate and tame those nomadic groups, which coincided with the settlement policies of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, 1908-1918)

in the name of making them 'civilized'.[14] Those groups not belonging to the Turkish culture would be settled in towns (but not as a group), and also through scattering they would be settled in villages of Turkish culture (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 143). Such a regulation, as B. shükrü Kaya (Interior Minister) stated, was inescapable because 'they are deprived of humanist, moral, national and political education and training. The fruits of the Republic have not yet reached them… This law included the rules to make those citizens civilized and improved' (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 141, my emphasis). According to Paragraphs A and B of Article 10 of the Law, the ashiret was no longer acknowledged as a legal personality; all previous rights and titles - reis (chiefdom), bey (master), aga (feudal lord), sheyh (sheik) - associated with tribes, stemming from either some legal or traditional structure, were brought to an end. Paragraph Ç stated that those members of an ashiret who were Turkish citizens, but did not belong to the Turkish culture, would be settled separately in the second region, and other nomadic ashiret, of Turkish citizens and culture, would be settled in other suitable places.[15] Thus, the tendency to destroy the local, traditional power centers through the closing of tekkes, zaviyes and medreses in the mid-1920s culminated in the elimination of the remaining sections of particularistic, traditional affiliations in the society. These intermediary structures had to be destroyed, for these 'last social organizations of the Middle Ages' were regarded as 'unnatural', 'archaic' structures threatening as autonomous entities the unity of the Turkish nation (see Neshet Hakkí's statements in TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 68).

The Law, as mentioned above, was mainly focused on linguistic and cultural integration. The main measure was to scatter individuals with different languages and different cultures. Article 11 banned 'the establishment of a village and a quarter in towns, workers' and artisans' organizations, composed of individuals whose mother tongue was not Turkish', or 'such individuals monopolizing a village, a quarter, a job or a craft for their same kind'.[16] At the same time, it charged the Ministry of Interior Affairs with the authority to relocate people of different cultures or languages, who had previously constituted a separate group, but not en masse. The duration of settlement was described in Article 27: the government-led settlers (muhacir, refugees, nomads and those who were transferred from the first region) had to live at least for ten years in the places where they were settled by the government.

During the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, the policy makers took all of the above measures to provide 'cultural unity' by destroying the social bases of various linguistic and cultural groups, so preventing them from organizing

as separate communities where they would maintain their distinct languages and customs. Here, relying on the effort to create, in the words of shükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior Affairs, 'a nation/country with one language, one thought and one feeling' (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 141), it was aimed at fusing them with the people speaking the 'Turkish language' and belonging to the 'Turkish culture' by providing for their linguistic and cultural integration into the nation. This quest to homogenize is of course much more than simply making all people speak the same language. Also, homogenization meant the appropriation of a 'civilized' way of life, or the 'Turkish culture', manufactured at the center. As an official document it implies, in a general sense, boundary-making in such a way that the boundaries of Turkish culture were differentiated from their 'reactionary' and 'particularistic' surroundings.

Concluding Remarks

From the beginning the Kemalist modernization project was accompanied by a process of cultural production. As the main active agent in the process, the State employed new techniques of power including the state instruments' in an effort to revolutionize society from above. Kemalist nationalism lay at the center of this new form of politics. It was akin to Tilly's 'top-down' typology of nationalism. It indicated the direction of the official modernist programme of civilization and culture during the formative decades of the Republic. Here, the aim was to transform society by transmuting all traditional structures into a 'developed' and 'civilized' whole; that is, society became a target for constructing a 'better' future. It was through this process that the state discourse on culture was produced. The new cultural institutions of the Republic, as both producers and carriers of the official discourse on 'culture', became the basic agents for promoting and imposing a 'national and secular way of life' that comprised the prescriptions of how people think, perceive life and act, and was rather close to the concept of 'mentality'. This mentality was seen in terms of the collective notions that the civilizing rulers strove to make part of everyday practice.

At the same time, the Kemalist concept of culture differentiates to a greater extent from that of Romanticism, because that culture was not defined within the circle of Geist, historically and contextually formed throughout centuries, and was not taken as the basis of a critique of civilization. As in the Jacobin model, what was most emphasized around the concept of culture was the image of human self-cultivation and the cultivation of society, which lies at the center of the Kemalist civilizing project.

Culture as an idea and discourse seemed to express the construction of a 'modern' society and 'civilized' citizens. So the state discourse on culture

did not accept the equal value of all forms of life and then assumed a strict hierarchy among them. It is hierarchical and radically assimilationist.[17] By setting a strict hierarchy between 'archaic', 'backward' life forms and 'modern', 'civilized' ones[18] and applying coercive and non-coercive radical assimilation policies, the politics of culture in the early Republican regime constituted a set of processes employing both exclusion and inclusion. The Kemalist nation-building project promoted a process of assimilation for everybody defined as citizens, but at the same time determined a public good and identity only accessible to those who internalized the new value system; those who did not were excluded. This hierarchical and exclusionary inclusion concept of culture made the Kemalists isolate themselves from all traditional and particular positions and transform them into sameness. As the basis of Kemalist nation-building, it coincided with the de-legitimization of the past or the Islamic/Ottoman heritage.

These peculiarities imply the specificity of the Turkish case, which was denoted through non-colonial nationalism, a specific nation-building process initiated by the strong, centralized state in a non-Western context, and the politically defined and determined concept of culture not as a unique category, primarily distinguishing simply the Turks from Europeans. The content and meaning of this culture was defined by a group of the ruling elite with a mission to civilize the 'ignorant' and 'unconscious' people. In fact, their stand reflected a sort of 'civilizing process' that is used by Norbert Elias to refer to the long process of the emergence of modern society later accompanying state-formation and nation-building in Europe.[19] In the hands of the Kemalists, it turned into a 'civilizing' pressure on the people through the disciplinary practices by means of schooling and adult education in the Army and the People's Houses, and so the Kemalist model might be formulated as a civilizing process from above.

Following the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, the official notion of culture, which appeared to be the name of participating in politics, began to be questioned to a certain extent, especially by the forces of the periphery. In the previous period, those who denied welcoming the Kemalist cultural capital were excluded. That is why official Turkish nationalism and symbolism failed to completely replace the wider Islamic allegiance of the people, due to its exclusionary characteristics. The process, in turn, has made the official definition of Turkish culture a chief objective of political debate. Discussion went on around whether it was original/authentic or derivative/foreign. The result was cultural wars between the strong holders or interpreters of Kemalism on the one hand, and the parochial elite and masses on the other, which caused to some extent four military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) in politics.

Notes

[1] In anti-colonial nationalism, a backward society could modernize itself by synthesizing the materiality of the West and the spirituality of the East, and so asserting a cultural identity distinct from the foreigners or colonizers was possible, while achieving material progress. For anti-colonial nationalism see Chattarjee (1992).

[2] The 1931 programme of the RPP as an official document for the first time mentioned the six principles of Kemalism (Tunçay 1992: 447-454). Kemalism continued to be developed throughout the 1930s. As a 'political discourse' it both described the boundaries of politics and provided the standard for judging attitudes in every sphere of social life.

[3] To write this section some of his views on culture are chosen which cannot be easily linked with any specific contextual frames of the 1930s. It is obvious that the context was the social milieu of this period as the state and its 'knowing' rulers entered into re-defining their conceptual framework in terms of culture and its relation to civilization.

[4] Parallel to his general orientation until 1923, his view on culture seemed to be under the effect of Gökalp's ideals; well built in moral character (seciye) and history of the Turks, it should be saved from all corruptive and immoral influences coming from the West and the East. After that time, in his statements we cannot witness such an emphasis on "authentic," unique notions of culture. (For his statements on the issue during the 1920s see Kantarcíoglu 1987: 88-94.)

[5] This programme brought about first of all the ideological restructuring for state policies on the creation of a new society. The basic emphasis was now placed on culture that would be created. (For the 1931 programme see Tunçay 1992: 447-458.)

[6] On this Webster reported that he read all special editions of the more important daily newspapers, the special publications of Chambers of Commerce, party locals and national organizations. And he realized that 'they appeared to follow a single model. That model was the Anniversary brochure… bearing the simple title '10'' (Webster 1939: 184).

[7] In fact, as Linke reported, 'in the recruitment poster of the 1930s shifty looking youths were transformed into fit strapping young men wearing modern Western clothes in contrast to the old days of bearded turbaned men' (Linke 1937: 330).

[8] Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 'Ískan Kanunu' (Law of Settlement), n. 2733. Ankara: Prime Ministry, June 21, 1934.

[9] The RPP's 1935 Programme adopted the policy for 'the increase of the population and the bringing up of a strong and healthy future generation' determined in Part VI.

[10] The boundaries of these regions were not clear even during the discussions on the law at the Parliament (see TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 148). It seems obvious that the first region included places of the Eastern region mostly inhabited by people of Kurdish origin; yet the second one included areas where Turkish-speaking groups were dominant.

[11] This was determined in Article12 (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 144).

Similarly Article 13 established those who were not going to settle in the second region set aside for immigrants, refugees, nomads of the same region and those transferred from the first and third regions (ibid: 145). Both Articles were amended with the Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

[12] During the sessions on the Law, one of the heated discussions was on the usage of the term soy (in its broader sense, race). B. shükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior Affairs, proposed the term írk (which may be roughly translated as race) instead of soy, which was accepted. In his usage, and that of other defenders in the Parliament, írk came to mean a comprising term expressing more than racial ties. On this account, Mustafa Reshit stated, 'those who have migrated to Turkey but do not belong to Turkish culture were called Turks from a racial point of view. But due to not being part of Turkish culture, they do not speak Turkish. In fact, they are our true citizens and also true brothers' (TBMM Zabít Ceridesi, IV/23, 7-6-1934: 144-145).

[13] Although the migration of Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus was accepted, the migrations of the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian origin, were rejected (Somel 1997: 81).

[14] Abdülhamid II's civilizing policies in late 19th century became apparent in both the centralized educational policies and the policy of the compulsory settling of the nomads. In the context of an imperial structure faced with a legitimacy crisis in the eyes of its subjects and the problem of their loyalty to the state, to provide a common identity, the basic mission of the educational policies was to 'gradually 'civilize' subject populations into espousing the value system of the center' (Deringil 1998: 110). In the latter policy this trend was, as best expressed in Deringil's phrase, 'the 'civilizing' or 'Ottomanizing' of the nomad' (Deringil 1998: 67). The policy based on a 'modernizing-civilizing mission' targeted especially nomadic peoples with heterodoxical and heretic beliefs, including Turkmen, Alawis, Nusayris, Iraqi Shiites, and so on. They had to be 'tamed' and 'civilized', since they were regarded as ignorant, barbaric and uncivilized, by means of judging their positions according to Civilization. Here 'civilizing' meant making them Sunni and part of a centralized order through their forceful settlement and empire-wide educational system. The CUP on the basis of a more nationalist tone, to transform traditional ways into a more developed form, also applied that policy of 'civilizing' and 'modernizing'.

[15] Together with Item C anticipating the forceful migration of reis,aga, sheyh, and their families living in the borders, Item C was amended with Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

[16] This article was amended with Law no. 5098/13, 18/6/1947.

[17] I use the concept of 'radical assimilation' in line with Mason's formulation. 'Radical assimilationists', writes Mason, 'aim to create a polity in which members of the nondominant cultural communities abandon all their distinctive customs and practices' (Mason 1999: 267).

[18] This is based on the logic of transforming cultural differences into a homogenous whole, by 'hierarchicizing' ways of life, in favor of a 'high' or 'developed' form of life (Bennett 1998: 104).

[19] The civilizing process implies the development of social standards relating, for

instance, to customs of eating, washing, spitting, blowing one's nose, urinating and defecating, and undressing. In the process these standards were absorbed as habits in mostly implicit ways. Later they gradually became the civilizing devices, which the modern state imposed on its citizens. (See Elias 1978)

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